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CIRCUIT SPLIT ON CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
PUBLIC CARRY STATUTES: WHY THE SUPREME
COURT SHOULD HOLD THAT STATES AND
MUNICIPALITIES KNOW BEST
A well regulatedMilitia,being necessary to the security of afree State, the
1
right of the people to keep and bearArms, shall not be infringed.
I.

INTRODUCTION

As mass shootings2 occur on what seems like a monthly basis, the
topic of gun control in the United States is a hot button issue covered by
media outlets across the country.' From elementary and high schools to
1

U.S. CONST. amend. II.
2 See WILLIAM J. KROUSE & DANIEL J. RICHARDSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44126,
MASS MURDER WITH FIREARMS: INCIDENTS AND VICTIMS, 1999-2013 4-6 (2015), available at

https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44126.pdf [https://perma.cc/KTR9-ZQSF] (defining mass shooting).
3 See Tamara Audi, Devlin Barrett & Jim Carlton, San Bernardino Shooting: At Least 14
People Killed, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 3,2015,1:13 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/active-shooterreported-in-southern-california-1449085770
[https://perma.cc/5W3Z-VNM5]
(reporting that
fourteen employees were killed while attending company holiday party); James Barron, Nation
Reels After Gunman Massacres20 Children at School in Connecticut,N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/15/nyregion/shooting-reported-at-connecticut-elementaryschool.html [https://perma.cc/Z23Y-JCFB] (recapping tragic deaths of twenty children and six
adults at elementary school); Jennifer Brown, 12 Shot Dead, 58 Wounded in Aurora Movie Theater
During Batman Premier, DENVER POST (July 20, 2012, 3:30 PM), https://www.denverpost.com
/2012/07/20/12-shot-dead-58-wounded-in-aurora-movie-theater-during-batman-premier/
[https://perma.cc/JNB4-T74R] (explaining events that took place when gunman killed twelve at
movie theater); Eileen AJ Connelly & Lauren Italiano, 11 Killed, Six Injuredin 'Horrific' Shooting
at Pittsburgh Synagogue, N.Y. POST (Oct. 27, 2018, 11:14 AM), https://nypost.com/2018/10/
27/multiple-people-dead-in-shooting-at-pittsburgh-synagogue/
[https://perma.cc/VZ8N-9CZS]
(explaining events where eleven people lost lives in synagogue); Lynn Bui, et al., At Least 59 Killed
in Las Vegas Shooting Rampage, More Than 500 Others Injured,WASH. POST (Oct. 2,2017, 11:01
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/10/02/police-shut-downpart-of-las-vegas-strip-due-to-shooting/?utm term=.cec5df666745 [https://perma.cc/S2YJ-2EAE]
(describing tragedy when gunman killed fifty-eight innocent victims); Peter Holley & Joel
Achenbach, 'It Was JustComplete Chaos': OrlandoMassacreSurvivors on the DesperateStruggle
to Stay Alive, WASH. POST (June 13,2016,6:09 PM),https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postnationlwp/2016/06/12/it-was-just-complete-chaos-survivors-of-orlando-massacre-recalldesperate-struggle-to-stay-alive/ [https://perma.cc/6UMD-BTAH] (explaining struggle to survive
when gunman opened fire massacring forty-nine individuals at Orlando nightclub); Jon Kamp &
Scott Calvert, Gunman Kills 17 in FloridaHigh School Shooting, WALL STREET J. (Feb. 15, 2018,
9:53 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/shooting-at-florida-high-school-authorities-report-15186
38881 [https://perma.cc/H8JL-NEPX] (reporting on murder of fourteen students and three staff
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movie theaters to concerts to bars and nightclubs, mass shootings can occur
anywhere .4 Due in part to the rise in mass shootings, a majority of Americans
favor stricter laws governing the sale of firearms.' The rest of the world
believes stricter legislation is the simple resolution to the United States' "gun
problem."'6 Stricter gun legislation can take many forms, such as requiring
universal background checks for purchasers of firearms, raising the
purchasing age of shotguns and rifles to twenty-one years old, or placing
restrictions on individuals who wish to procure public carry permits-the
focus of this Note.7 The debate about firearms and the Second Amendment
will continue for generations as Republicans and Democrats, and rural and
urban populations differ drastically in their opinions about the extent to
which the government should regulate the ownership of and right to carry
firearms .

members); Juan A. Lozano, Up to 10 Dead in Shooting at Texas High School; Shooter in Custody,
CI. SUN TIMES (May 18, 2018, 5:40 PM), https://chicago.suntimes.com/news/active-shootertexas-high-school/ [https://perma.cc/7GAJ-2AM3] (depicting tragedy where gunman killed eight
students and two teachers); David Montgomery, Christopher Mele & Manny Fernandez, Gunman
Kills at Least 26 in Attack on Rural Texas Church, N.Y. TiMEs (Nov. 5, 2017), https://www.ny
times.com/2017/11/05/us/church-shooting-texas.html [https://perma.cc/2S8F-9GHQ] (recounting
tragedy when twenty-six members of church lost their lives); Jose A. Del Real, Jennifer Medina &
Tim Arango, CaliforniaShooting Kills 12 at Country Music Bar, a Year After Las Vegas, N.Y.
2
TIMES (Nov. 8, 2018), https://wwwanytimes.conm/ 018/11/08/us/shooting-california-thousandmurder of twelve innocent victims).
(detailing
oaks.htmi [https://perma.cc/WRF2-6JHW]
4 See sources cited supra note 3 (showing harsh reality of how mass shootings can occur
anywhere).
5 See Guns, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1645/guns.aspx (last visited Apr. 7, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/4PDV-4DFK] (showing how sixty-one percent of Americans favor more gun
restrictions, up seventeen percent since 2010); see also Annual Gun Law Scorecard, GtFFORDS L.
CTR., https://lawcenter.giffords.org/scorecard/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2020) [https://perma.cc
/KXU4-ZMQK] (providing grade to each state based on its gun laws).
6 See Another Day, Another Slaughter, IRISH TIMES (Dec. 4, 2015), https://www.irishtimes
.com/opinion/editorial/another-day-another-slaughter-1.2453719 [https:// perma.cc/3RSF-NAYA]
(showing how "the rest of the world looks on with utter bewilderment" as United States grapples
with gun rights); see also America's Gun Culture in Charts, BBC NEWS (Aug. 5, 2019),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-41488081 [https://perma.cc/G62Q-QWT2] (showing
various polls on gun ownership and control in America after Pittsburgh synagogue shooting).
7 See Ian Urbina, A Look at CaliforniaGun Laws, Among the Toughest in the Nation, N.Y.
TtMES (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/08/us/california-gun-laws.html [https://
perma.cc/RV9U-N4YF] (listing all of California's gun regulations).
8 See J. Baxter Oliphant, BipartisanSupportfor Some Gun Proposals,Stark PartisanDivisions
on Many Others, PEW RES. CTR.(June 23, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/06/
23/bipartisan-supp[rt-ftr-stme-gun-prppssa/s-stark-partisan-divisiIns-on-many-others/ [https://
perma.cc/85UM-UFG3] (highlighting sharp divide amongst Democrats and Republicans on
various gun policy proposals); see also Ruth Igielnik, Rural and Urban Gun Owners Have Different
Experiences, Views on Gun Policy, PEW RES. CTR. (July 10, 2017), http://www.pewresearch
.org/fact-tank/2017/07/10/rural-and-urban-gun-owners-have-different-experiences-views-on-gun-
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The extent of the Second Amendment's protection of an individual's
right to gun ownership was unclear until about a decade ago when the
Supreme Court issued two landmark decisions on the issue. 9 In 2008, the
Court, in Heller, held that D.C.'s "ban on handgun possession in the home
violate[d] the Second Amendment, as [did] its prohibition against rendering
any lawful firearm in the home operable for the purpose of immediate selfdefense."' In 2010, the Court in McDonaldheld that the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated Heller's holding on the states. I
Although the Heller and McDonald Courts clearly established an individual
right to gun ownership for the purpose of self-defense in the home, circuits
have grappled with and disagreed as to whether the Second Amendment
provides individuals with an unfettered right to carry their firearms, whether
concealed or open, in public ,2 Some circuits have determined that the right
does extend outside the home; thus, statutes effectively banning public carry

are unconstitutional. 3 Other circuits have determined that virtually identical

policy/ [https://perma.cc/8N3D-EXNG] (emphasizing how experiences of both rural and urban
citizens have shaped their views).
9 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (holding Second Amendment
protects individual right to bear arms for purposes of self-defense within home); McDonald v. City
of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742,791 (2010) (requiring states to recognize Court's holding in Heller).
10 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (requiring D.C. to permit Heller to register his handgun and
issue him license for self-defense purposes).
i1 See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 791 (forcing all states to abide by Court's holding in Heller).
12 Compare Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659,662 (1st Cir. 2018),petitionfor cert.filed, (U.S.
Apr. 1, 2019) (No. 18-1272) (finding Massachusetts firearm licensing statute restricting public
carry as constitutional under Second Amendment), and Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426,440 (3d Cir.
2013) (concluding applicants required to demonstrate "justifiable need" to publicly carry handgun
does not burden Second Amendment), and Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 882 (4th Cir.
2013) (holding good-and-substantial-reason requirement burdened Second Amendment, but
significant governmental interest permitted it), and Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d
81, 101 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that proper cause requirement was constitutional restriction on
Second Amendment), with Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044, 1074 (9th Cir. 2018), reh'g granted,
915 F.3d 681 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding that Second Amendment protects right to openly carry
firearm in public for self-defense), and Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 667 (D.C.
Cir. 2017) (reasoning that core right of Second Amendment is to carry firearms - concealed or
openly - for "personal self-defense outside home"), and Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933,942 (7th
Cir. 2012) (holding Second Amendment confers right to bear arms for self-defense, which extends
outside home).
13 See Young, 896 F.3d at 1074 ("[For better or for worse, the Second Amendment does
protect a right to carry a firearm in public for self-defense."); Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 667 ("At the
Second Amendment's core lies the right of responsible citizens to carry firearms for personal selfdefense beyond the home, subject to longstanding restrictions."); Moore, 702 F.3d at 942 ("The
Supreme Court has decided that the amendment confers a right to bear arms for self-defense, which
is as important outside the home as inside.").
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statutes are constitutional .14 These circuits, in applying intermediate
scrutiny, conclude that the decision is ultimately in the hands of the
legislature, and that the statutes do not violate the Second Amendment
because it is not an outright ban, but rather a requirement to show a need for
an open-carry permit. 5
When starting the research for this Note, the Court had continued to
allow for a circuit split to exist regarding whether states had the right to
restrict a person's right to carry a firearm in public. 6 In fact, the Court had
not addressed a Second Amendment issue since McDonald.'7 In 2017,
Justice Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch dissented in the Court's decision
not to grant certiorari to a case where the Ninth Circuit validated a statute,
which restricted individuals' right to carry a concealed firearm.18 With the
14 See Gould, 907 F.3d at 672 ("Public carriage of firearms for self-defense falls outside the

perimeter of this core right."); Drake, 724 F.3d at 431 ("[wie decline to definitively declare that the
individual right to bear arms for the purpose of self-defense extends beyond the home .... ");
Woollard, 712 F.3d at 876 ("we merely assume that the Heller right exists outside the home and
that such right of Appellee Woollard has been infringed. We are free to make that assumption
because the good-and-substantial-reason requirement passes constitutional muster under what we
have deemed to be the applicable standard--intermediate scrutiny."); Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 96
("The historical prevalence of the regulation of firearms in public demonstrates that while the
Second Amendment's core concerns are strongest inside hearth and home, states have long
recognized a countervailing and competing set of concerns with regard to handgun ownership and
use in public.").
15 See cases cited supra note 14 (noting reasoning of circuits that hold permitting statutes
constitutional).
16 See cases cited supra note 12 (emphasizing Court's allowance of existing split).
17 See generally McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (pointing to most recent
Supreme Court decision of Second Amendment issue).
18 See Peruta v. California, 137 S. Ct. 1995, 1997 (2017) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari) (arguing Ninth Circuit improperly "limit[ed] its review to whether the Second
Amendment protects the right to concealed carry -as opposed to the more general right to public
carry -was untenable."). Justice Thomas sharply rebuked the Ninth Circuit's decision to reverse
a panel of judges by way of an en banc hearing, pointing out that this decision refrained the issue
to whether concealed carry was constitutional when the complaint "called into question the State's
regulatory scheme as a whole[,]" which would encompass open carry as well. Id. Imploring the
Court to give the Second Amendment its due, Justice Thomas provided the following statistics:
Since [McDonald], we have heard argument[s] in... roughly 35 cases where the
question presented turned on the meaning of the First Amendment and 25 cases that
turned on the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. This discrepancy is inexcusable,
especially given how much less developed our jurisprudence is with respect to the
Second Amendment as compared to the First and Fourth Amendments.
Id. at 1999. See Silvester v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 945,951 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari) (arguing that Court's refusal to grant certiorari undermined Heller and McDonald
because "double standard [in applying intermediate scrutiny in Second Amendment cases] is
apparent from other cases where the Ninth Circuit applies heightened scrutiny."). Justice Thomas
labeled the Second Amendment as "this Court's constitutional orphan. And the lower courts seem
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appointment of Justice Brett Kavanaugh in 2018, the Court has a new
member who will likely join Thomas and Gorsuch in granting certiorari to a
case, which could (1) determine whether the Second Amendment provides
individuals with a right to carry a firearm outside the home, and (2) declare
a standard of scrutiny that should be applied in determining the
constitutionality of state statutes that restrict the right to public carry.19 In
fact, the Court heard oral arguments regarding an appeal pertaining to the
Second Amendment on December 2, 2019.2° On April 27, 2020, the Court
issued an opinion .21 Even though the Court chose to vacate and remand due

to mootness instead of addressing the merits of the case, the Court's
willingness to hear a Second Amendment case means it could likely hear
another Second Amendment case where it could explain the following: (1)

whether an individual's Second Amendment right to bear arms for the

to have gotten the message." Id. at 952. Justice Thomas found it inexcusable that the Court
overlooked the Ninth Circuit's improper application of heightened scrutiny, essentially reviewing
Second Amendment issues under a rational basis standard. Id.; but see Darrell A. H. Miller, The
Second Amendment and Second-Class Rights, HARv. L. REV. BLOG (Mar. 5, 2018), https:/iblog.
harvardlawreview.org/the-second-amendment-and-second-class-rights/
[https://perma.cc/GB3XH64Z] ("Just days before Justice Thomas dissented in Silvester, seventeen people were killed with
a legally purchased AR-15 in yet another school shooting. Despite the mobilization of the survivors
of that tragedy, and despite overwhelming polling that something, something needs to be done
about gun violence; early indications are that - like every time before - no meaningful regulation
will materialize. Indeed, the right to keep and bear arms may expand as a result. If that's how a
right is treated in second class, I can't imagine how it's treated in first.").
19 See Tell Your Senators to Confirm Justice Brett Kavanaugh to the US. Supreme Court,
NAT'L RIFLE ASS'N INST. FOR LEGIS. AcTION, https://www.nraila.org/campaigns/2018/brettkavanaugh/ (last visited May 6, 2020) [https://perma.cc/X7XN-FXSD] (showing NRA
endorsement of Kavanaugh nomination due to his previous support of Second Amendment); Memo:
Supreme Court CertiorariGrantin N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. City of New York, GIFFORDS
L. CTR. (Jan. 24, 2019), https://giffords.org/2019/01/nysrpa-memo/ [https://perma.cc/AA9CKXNM] ("Under Justice Kavanaugh's interpretation of the Second Amendment, judges should
play no role in assessing the 'costs and benefits of gun regulations.' This radical view would allow
judges to pick and choose which gun regulations have adequate historical support and invalidate
all other laws.").
20 See generally N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. City of New York, 883 F.3d 45, 54 (2d Cir.
2018) (finding statute constitutional because it still permitted lawful use of firearms inside home),
cert. granted, 139 S.Ct. 939 (Jan. 22, 2019) (No. 18-280); see also New York State Rifle & Pistol
Association Inc. v. City of New York, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/cases/2019/18-280 (last visited
May 6, 2020) [https://perma.cc/4RF8-MHFN] (linking to audio of oral argument); Amy Howe,
Argument Analysis: Justices Focus on Mootness in Challenge to Now-Repealed New York City Gun
Rule, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 2, 2019, 1:53 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/12/argumentanalysis-justices-focus-on-mootness-in-challenge-to-now-repeaed-new-york-city-gun-rule/
[https://perma.cc/E4UT-GGR6] (discussing oral argument and how Justices focused on mootness
issue).
21 See generally N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. City of New York, No. 18-280, 2020 WL
1978708, at *1 (U.S. Apr. 27, 2020) (holding issue was moot, so Court did not reach merits of
case).
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purposes of self-defense extends outside the home; or (2) what standard of
scrutiny lower courts should apply in Second Amendment cases .22
This Note will analyze the current public carry circuit split that exists
with a particular focus on Young, a case that may possibly find its way to the
Supreme Court in the future .23 The Ninth Circuit has granted an en banc
hearing in Young and appears primed to overturn the majority decision that
Young
deemed Hawaii's gun ownership statute unconstitutional.24
represents a case where the Supreme Court may grant certiorari after the
panel's opinion is overturned by an en banc panel that could clarify: (1)
whether the right to carry firearms for the purpose of self-defense extends
outside of the home; and (2) whether courts should apply intermediate or
strict scrutiny to determine the constitutionality of a state statute restricting
the public carrying rights of gun owners .25 Prior to laying out the details of
Young, it is critical to understand the historical analysis that the Court
conducted in Heller and McDonald because some circuit courts, as well as
the majority in Young, conducted a similar analysis in striking down state
statutes .26

22 See id. ("Petitioners' claim for declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the City's

old rule is therefore moot. Petitioners now argue, however, that the new rule may still infringe their
rights.... We do not here decide that dispute about the new rule; ... The judgment of the Court of
Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for such proceedings as are appropriate."); see also
Bernie Pazanowski, Supreme Court to Hear First Gun Case in Years, BLOOMBERG L. (Jan. 22,
2019, 9:35 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/supreme-court-to-hear-first-guncase-in-years [https://perma.cc/GU2V-RNU9] (highlighting how Court could determine level of
scrutiny to apply in Second Amendment cases).
23 See discussion infra Section II (discussing Young opinion); see also Young v. Hawaii, 896
F.3d 1044, 1071 (9th Cir. 2018) (pointing to focus of this Note), reh'g granted, 915 F.3d 681 (9th
Cir. 2019).
24 See Jonathan Stempel, U.S. Appeals Court to Revisit Open Carrying of Guns, REUTERS
(Feb. 8, 2019, 3:46 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-guns-court/u-s-appeals-court-torevisit-open-carrying-of-guns-idUSKCN1PX2A9 [https://perma.cc/2D2D-5WJ4] (discussing how
Ninth Circuit granted en banc hearing).
25 See Young, 896 F.3d at 1071 (laying out two-part test that Supreme Court should clarify);
id. at 1082-83 (Clifton, J., dissenting) (showing majority's failure to apply and dissent's application
of intermediate scrutiny).
26 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 803-05 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring)
("Historical analysis can be difficult; it sometimes requires resolving threshold questions, and
making nuanced judgments about which evidence to consult and how to interpret it."); District of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 580-600 (2008) (explaining importance of understanding
historical sources analyzed in opinion); Young, 896 F.3d at 1054-69 (discussing extensive history);
see also infra Part II.
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II. HISTORY
In interpreting the text of the Constitution, the guiding principle is
that "[t]he Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its words
and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from
their technical meaning ....
,"27 After conducting a textual and historical
analysis, the majority in Heller rejected the dissent's view that the right to
28
bear arms was a collective right and, instead, held it was an individual right.
Justice Stevens's dissent accurately predicted the difficulty that the holding
would cause federal courts, which were tasked with determining the extent
to which states could regulate firearms .29 The Heller Court proclaimed that
the Second Amendment guaranteed an individual right to keep a handgun in
one's home for self-defense purposes, and the McDonald Court further
stressed that self-defense was at the heart of the Second Amendment and was
a right deeply rooted in the nation's history and tradition.30 Since Heller and
McDonald each discussed at length the embodiment of self-defense in the
Second Amendment, seven circuits have addressed whether the right to carry
for the purpose of self-defense extends outside the home.31
The Heller and McDonald Courts reviewed historical documents
3
and state statutes spanning from the Founding Era until after the Civil War. 1
Since Heller and McDonald conducted such an analysis, it is reasonable to

27 See United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716,731 (1931) (citations omitted) (expressing that
language should be understood as ordinary citizens would construe it).
28 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 577 (explaining dissent's collective right argument). Justice
Stevens's main argument was that "the preamble of the Second Amendment suggests that the uses
of the phrase ['the people'] in the First and Second Amendments are the same in referring to a
collective activity." Id. at 645-46 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
29 See id. at 679 (dissenting, J., Stevens) ("Until today, it has been understood that legislatures
may regulate the civilian use and misuse of firearms so long as they do not interfere with the
preservation of a well-regulated militia. The Court's announcement of a new constitutional right to
own and use firearms for private purposes upsets that settled understanding, but leaves for future
cases the formidable task of defining the scope of permissible regulations."); see also cases cited
supranote 13 (pointing to circuit split).
30 See Young, 896 F.3d at 1050-51 (summarizing Heller and McDonald).
31 See cases cited supra note 12 (exhibiting circuit split). The D.C., Seventh, and Ninth
Circuits examined the history of Second Amendment jurisprudence, essentially mirroring the
analysis done in Heller and McDonald, and arrived at the conclusion that individuals have a right
to openly carry firearms in public. See cases cited supra note 13. The First, Second, Third, and
Fourth Circuits argued that the history of state regulation is unclear; thus, they applied the
intermediate scrutiny test/review in arriving at the decision that states have a compelling interest to
regulate the open and concealed carry of their constituents. See cases cited supra note 14.
32 See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767-78 (engaging in historical analysis conducted by Heller
Court); Heller, 554 U.S. at 605-19 (performing extensive historical analysis of Second Amendment
jurisprudence).
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believe that the Court will similarly analyze whether the right to carry
extends outside the home; thus, it is essential to lay out a brief history of how
the Court arrived at its decision that the right to bear arms within an
individual's home for the purpose of self-defense is indeed an individual
right encompassed by the Second Amendment. 33 The Heller Court examined
an individual's right to bear arms by interpreting many historical documents,
including (1) the English Bill of Rights, which preceded the Second
Amendment, (2) legal commentaries utilized by the Framers of the
Constitution, including the works of William Blackstone, St. George Tucker,
and Joseph Story, (3) Founding-era statutes, and (4) Nineteenth Century state
court opinions- specifically from the period which the Court refers to as the
Antebellum South.34

Additional sources cited by circuit courts since

McDonald and Heller will also be discussed. 35 It is critical to glean as much
information from the sources cited in Heller in order to determine if those
sources speak to whether the right to carry extends outside the home, or
whether history shows that states have a right to restrict individuals' Second
Amendment rights once a gun owner brings or wants to bring that gun
outside their home .36
A. Pre-Foundingand Founding-EraSources
The English Bill of Rights recognized the following right: "[t]he
Subjects which are Protestants may have Arms for their Defence suitable to
their Conditions and as allowed by Law." 37 Through its historical analysis,
the Heller Court determined that the English Bill of Rights provided an
individual right to bear arms .3 However, legal historians still argue (1)
whether the English right guaranteed an individual right to bear arms, and
39
(2) that the English right was less expansive than its American counterpart.
33 See Jonathan Meltzer, Open Carry for All: Heller and Our Nineteenth-Century Second
Amendment, 123 YALE L.J. 1486, 1489-90 (2014) (positing that Court will apply analysis similar
to Heller in potential Second Amendment case).
34 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 605-619 (examining historical documents).
35 See cases cited supra note 12.
36 See Meltzer, supra note 33, at 1490 ("The Court's (and, for that matter, the dissents') use of
history to determine the existence of an individual right to firearms suggests that elaboration of the
extent of the right will require further expeditions into the past.").
37 See Bill of Rights, 1689, 1 W. & M., c. 2 (Eng.).
38 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 593 ("This right has long been understood to be the predecessor to
our Second Amendment. It was clearly an individual right, having nothing whatever to do with
service in a militia... it was secured to [Protestants] as individuals, according to 'libertarian
political principles,' not as members of a fighting force." (internal citations omitted)).
39 Compare JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-

AMERICAN RIGHT 120-34 (1994) (arguing English right included self-defense component), with
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Although the majority in Heller recognized that the Second Amendment
affords an individual right to bear arms for the purpose of self-defense within
the home, the Court did not hint at whether that right extends outside the
home.a°

Both the Court in Heller and the Ninth Circuit in Young sought
guidance from William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws ofEngland,
which Heller deemed as the "preeminent authority on English law for the
founding generation."'" The Heller Court stated that Blackstone's view was
that the 1689 Declaration of Rights enshrined "the natural right of resistance
and self-preservation" and "the right of having and using arms for selfpreservation and defence."4 2 Heller concluded that because of Blackstone's
view that "by the time of the founding [the right was] understood to be an
individual right protecting against both public and private violence[;]" the
Ninth Circuit in Young reiterated this conclusion." Like most of the
historical interpretations conducted in Heller, there are historians who
disagree with the Court's analysis of Blackstone's and St. George Tucker's
works.44
St. George Tucker, an American law professor at the College of
William & Mary and a Blackstone scholar, argued that the right to armed
Patrick J. Charles, "Arms for Their Defence"?: An Historical,Legal, and Textual Analysis of the
English Right to Have Arms and Whether the Second Amendment Should Be Incorporatedin
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 351,374-79 (2009) (arguing English right did
not encompass individual right to self-defense).
40 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635-36 (limiting holding to right to bear arms with one's home).
41 See id. at 593-94 (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999)) (emphasizing
influence of Blackstone's works); Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044, 1053-54 (9th Cir. 2018)
(examining Blackstone's work and acknowledging its significance in Heller), reh'g granted, 915
F.3d 681 (9th Cir. 2019), 915 F.3d 681 (9th Cir. 2019).
42 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 594 (discussing Blackstone's description of arms provision); see
also WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 140 (Oxford,
Clarendon Press 1765) (showing how Blackstone believed self-defense was incorporated into 1689
Declaration of Rights).
43 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 594 (reasoning basis for individual right found in Blackstone's
work); Young, 896 F.3d at 1054 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 594) (stressing support for individual
right).
44 See Saul Cornell, St. George Tucker's Lecture Notes, the Second Amendment, and
OriginalistMethodology: A CriticalComment, 103 N.W.U.L. REV. 1541, 1552 (2009) [hereinafter
Lecture Notes] ("Tucker's earliest writings on the Second Amendment support neither...
individual-rights views of the Second Amendment nor the majority opinion in Heller. Tucker's
vision of the Second Amendment is not consistent with either the modern gun control or gun-rights
view of the Second Amendment."); Saul Cornell, St. George Tucker and the Second Amendment:
Original Understandingsand Modern Misunderstandings,47 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1123, 1124
(2006) [hereinafter Original Understandings] ("The individual rights misreading of Tucker is
merely the latest example of how constitutional scholarship has been hijacked for ideological
purposes in this bitter debate.").
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self-defense is the "first law of nature" and that "the right of the people to
45
Heller found that
keep and bear arms" is the "true palladium of liberty."
46
to self-defense.
right
individual
Tucker's writings clearly supported an
Whereas the majority in Heller used Blackstone and Tucker's writings to
show that the Second Amendment encompassed an individual right to bear

arms, Justice Stevens argued that "[tihere is not so much as a whisper in
[former Justice Story's writings] that [he] believed that the right secured by
the Amendment bore any relation to private use or4 possession of weapons

for activities like hunting or personal self-defense.

45 See 1 HENRY ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF
REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 300 (Phil. William Young Birch & Abraham
Small 1803) (arguing for right to bear arms as essential show of one's liberty). Tucker further
stated that "[i]f, for example, congress were to pass a law prohibiting any person from bearing arms,
as a means of preventing insurrections, the judicial courts ... would be able to pronounce decidedly
upon the constitutionality of these means." Id. at 289. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S.
742, 769 (2010) (asserting Tucker's notes as descriptive of founding-era understanding); Michael
P. O'Shea, Modeling the Second Amendment Right to Carry Arms (I): Judicial Tradition and the
Scope of "Bearing Arms" for Self-Defense, 61 AM. U.L. REv. 585, 638 (2012) ("Tucker thus
perfectly fits the antebellum pattern: early American sources that treated self-defense as an
important purpose of the right to bear arms accordingly viewed it as protecting presumptive carry
rights."). But see Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller, and OriginalistJurisprudence,56
UCLA L. REV. 1343, 1361 (2009) ("In some American jurisdictions today, for example, openly
carrying a firearm might plausibly be thought to violate the ancient common law prohibition against
'terrifying the good people of the land' by going about with dangerous and unusual weapons."
(quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 148 (Oxford,
Clarendon Press 1765))).
46 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 594-95,606 (showing Tucker's commentaries as supportive of right
to bear arms for self-defense). But see id. at 666 n.32 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Tucker suggested
that the [Second] Amendment should be understood in the context of the compromise over military
power .. "); see also Original Understandings, supra note 44, at 1148-49 (opining Court
oversimplified Tucker's views on gun rights). Cornell postulated that prior to Heller, "[w]eapons
intended primarily for self-defense with little utility for military engagement would not have
enjoyed constitutional protection but would have enjoyed some limited protection under common
law, subject to state regulation." Original Understandings,supra note 44, at 1149. Cornell also
argued that "traveling armed, even with militia weapons, would have still been subject to reasonable
regulations and some types of common law constraints." Id. Finally, Cornell in arguing that the
right to bear arms coincided with militia service, stated that "[a]ttending [a formal gathering of
troops] with arms would have enjoyed robust constitutional protection." Id.
47 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 668 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Justice Story emphasizing
"paramount importance" of militia). The majority argued that Justice Stevens's interpretation of
Story's writings was incorrect because Story equated the English Bill of Rights inclusion of a right
to bear arms-a right which the majority stated had "nothing to do with militia service"-with the
Second Amendment in the following passage:

A similar provision [to the Second Amendment] in favour of protestants ... is to be
found in the bill of rights of 1688, it being declared, "that the subjects ... may have arms
for their defence suitable to their condition, and as allowed by law." But under various
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B. ColonialLaws
There is a longstanding tradition of state regulation of firearm
possession and public use because of the dangers those activities pose. 48 In
1692, the colony and province of Massachusetts Bay enacted a statute that
allowed the justice of the peace to arrest those who "shall ride or go armed
[o]ffensively before any of [t]heir [m]ajesties' [j]ustices ... or elsewhere, by
[n]ight or by [d]ay, in [f]ear or [a]ffray of [t]heir [m]ajesties' [1]iege
[p]eople ....
Four states adopted a right to bear arms prior to the
ratification of the Second Amendment.5 0 Massachusetts' Declaration of
Rights protected the right of the people to "keep and bear arms for the
common defence."'" In Heller,the majority interpreted art. XVII, along with
the three other state constitutional provisions, as encompassing an individual
right.5 2 During the Founding Era, a number of colonies and states enacted
laws regulating firearms in order to promote public safety."' Additionally,
",4

pretences the effect of this provision has been greatly narrowed; and it is at present in
England more nominal than real, as a defensive privilege.
Id. at 608 (majority opinion) (citations omitted).
48

See Saul Cornell & Nathan DeDino, A Well Regulated Right: The Early American Origins

of Gun Control,73 FORDHAM L. REv. 487, 506-16 (2004) (discussing history of colony and state
regulation use of firearms).
" AN ACT FOR THE PUNISHMENT OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS, MASS. LAWS Ch. XVI (1692)
(showing regulation of arms prior to Second Amendment); see also AN ACT AGAINST WEARING
SWORDS, ETC., NJ. LAWS CHAP. IX (1689) ("[N]o person ... shall presume privately to wear any
pocket pistol, skeins, stilladers, daggers or dirks, or other unusual or unlawful weapons within this
Province.").
50 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 601-02 (acknowledging right to bear arms predating Second
Amendment in North Carolina, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Vermont).
51 See MASS. CONST. art. 17 (citing Massachusetts equivalent of Second Amendment).
52 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 602 (interpreting early state constitutions as protecting individual
right to bear arms); see also James A. Henretta, Collective Responsibilities, PrivateArms, and State
Regulation: Toward the Original Understanding,73 FORDHAM L. REv. 529, 537 (2004) ("I say
'some sort' of constitutional protection because it is abundantly clear that this individual right was
neither universal in scope nor unlimited in application."). But see PATRICK J. CHARLES, ARMED
IN AMERICA: A HISTORY OF GUN RIGHTS FROM COLONIAL MILITIAS TO CONCEALED CARRY 8790 (2018) (arguing Article XVII was intimately tied to militia service, not individual right).
53 See Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81,95 n.19 (2d Cir. 2012) (discussing
four states that regulated carrying and storage of gun powder); Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d
684, 705 (7th Cir. 2011) ("The City points to a number of founding-era, antebellum, and
Reconstruction state and local laws that limited the discharge of firearms in urban environments.");
Joseph Blocher, FirearmLocalism, 123 YALE L.J. 82, 112-20 (2013) (showing cities enacted laws
because of fire danger from gun powder storage and gun violence). Many legal scholars gloss over
the fact that legislation of firearms existed for the purposes of promoting public safety by
postulating that these laws had nothing to do with the right to carry. Blocher, supra note 53, at
112-20; see Robert H. Churchill, Gun Regulation, the Police Power, and the Right to Keep Arms
in Early America: The Legal Context of the Second Amendment, 25 LAW & HIST. REv. 139, 162
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some scholars look at laws promoting public safety as narrowly focused on
4
preventing fires or restricting guns in special areas, such as markets.5 Other
scholars emphasize how the Second Amendment is "particularly suited for
local tailoring." 5 The type of "local tailoring" that occurred in the Founding
Era also occurred in Kansas over a century later. 6
C. Antebellum South Period
After the Second Amendment was ratified, nine states adopted
constitutional provisions, which provided citizens with a right to keep and
bear arms." The majority in Heller focused heavily on this time period
because many state supreme courts58 explained that the Second Amendment
9
encompassed a right to carry firearms for the purpose of self-defense.
Despite many states' recognition of the right to openly carry outside the

(2007) (showing how cities and some states restricted right to carry); Lawrence Yun, Largest Cities
in the United States in 1776, and in 2076, NAT'L ASW'N OF REALTORS (July 3, 2012), http://
economistsoutlook.blogsxealtor.org/2012/07/03/largest-cities-in-the-united-states-in- 1776-andin-2076/ [https://perma.cc/A23N-VW5B] (highlighting population of cities over time).
54 See Meltzer, supra note 33, at 1504-09 (pointing to Meltzer's explanation of narrow
regulations). Meltzer points out that these state laws do not specifically address the carrying of
firearms, but, as Blocher points out, it shows the divide between urban and rural areas on how states
addressed the unique dangers that firearms and the storage of gunpowder posed. Id.; Blocher, supra
note 53, at 112-20 (emphasizing merits of constitutional localism).
55 See Blocher, supra note 53, at 112-20 (describing how laws were tailored to specific city
interests).
56 See DODGE CITY, KAN., CITY ORDINANCES no. 16, § 11 (Sept. 22, 1876) ("[A]ny person
who shall in the City of Dodge City, carry concealed, or otherwise, about his or her person, any ...
dangerous or deadly weapon, except United States Civil Officers, State, County, Township or City
officers shall be fined... Seventy-Five Dollars.").
57 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 585 n.8, 602 (listing states that adopted such provisions).
58 See State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612, 616 (1840) (upholding concealed weapon ban because
legislature still regulates "manner in which arms shall be borne"); State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18, 18
(1842) (holding that ban on concealed carry did not violate either state constitution or Second
Amendment); Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 250 (1846) (concluding that Second Amendment protects
broad right of all citizens to keep and bear arms); Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 90, 90
(1822) (holding statute prohibiting concealed carry of weapons violated "right of the citizens to
bear arms in defense of themselves and the state"); State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489,489 (1850)
(upholding concealed carry ban but interpreting Second Amendment as protecting carry for
purposes of self-defense); Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154, 161 (1840) (upholding
concealed weapons ban and adding that arms "must necessarily be borne openly"); Simpson v.
State, 13 Tenn. (5 Yer.) 356, 362 (1833) (reversing Simpson's conviction of affray because being
armed in public did not constitute punishment); State v Duke, 42 Tex. 455, 458 (1874) (holding
concealed carry not Second Amendment right).
59 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 585-86 (demonstrating majority's consultation of state court
holdings to determine whether Second Amendment encompassed individual right).
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home, concealed carry bans were often upheld." Relying on the Georgia
Supreme Court's Nunn opinion, Justice Scalia explained how the court
"perfectly captured the way in which the operative clause of the Second
Amendment furthers the purpose announced in the prefatory clause, in
continuity with the English right."61 The focus on this time period by Heller

sparked criticism from Justice Stevens in his dissent.62 However, although
Justice Stevens would not lend credence to this time period, it is unlikely that
the Court will disregard this time period if it hears another case concerning
the Second Amendment; instead, it will likely follow the groundwork laid
63
out in Heller.
D. Gun Laws in the South: Pre and Post Civil War

In Young, the majority acknowledged that prior to the Civil War,
southern states were emboldened to restrict the Second Amendment rights
of African Americans because of the Court's disgraceful decision in Dred

60 See Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An
Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1523 (2009) ("For over
150 years, the right to bear arms has generally been seen as limited in its scope to exclude concealed
carry."); see also Reid, 1 Ala. at 612 (upholding Alabama's ban on concealed weapons); Aymette,
21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) at 154 (upholding Tennessee's ban on concealed weapons).
61 See Heller, 554 U.S at 612 (admiring Georgia Supreme Court's explanation of individual's
right to bear arms). Scalia references the following passage:
The right of the whole people, old and young, men, women and boys, and not militia
only, to keep and bear arms of every description, and not such merely as are used by
the militia, shall not be infringed, curtailed, or broken in upon, in the smallest degree;
and all this for the important end to be attained: the rearing up and qualifying a wellregulated militia, so vitally necessary to the security of a free State. Our opinion is, that
any law, State or Federal, is repugnant to the Constitution, and void, which contravenes
this right, originally belonging to our forefathers, trampled under foot by Charles I. and
his two wicked sons and successors, re-established by the revolution of 1688, conveyed
to this land of liberty by the colonists, and finally incorporated conspicuously in our
own Magna Charta!
Id. at 612-13 (quoting Nunn, 1 Ga. at 251).
62 See Heller, 554 U.S at 662 n.28 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining how sources that
majority relied upon are inherently unreliable). Stevens particularly did not like the use of (1) postenactment commentary on the Second Amendment, and (2) post-Civil War legislative history
because "both have the same characteristics as postenactment legislative history, which is generally
viewed as the least reliable source of authority for ascertaining the intent of any provision's
drafters." Id.
63 See Meltzer, supra note 33, at 1510-11 (citing Heller, 554 U.S at 605) (emphasizing
majority use of this time period to understand "immediate aftermath of [the Second Amendment's]
ratification").
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Scott v. Sanford,64 where it held that Dred Scott, a freedman, had no rights
under the Constitution since African Americans had never been recognized
as sovereign peoples of the U.S.65 Due to the fear of rebellions and obvious
overt racism with the intent to dehumanize African Americans, southern
states enacted laws that stripped African Americans of their right to bear
arms. 6 6 In explaining why self-defense was at the core of the Second
Amendment, the McDonald Court pointed to instances of racism in the South
after the Civil War where bands of ex-Confederate soldiers disarmed and, in
some instances, murdered African Americans. 67 After losing the Civil War,
Confederate soldiers served in state militias and acted as an "overbearing"
force violently disarming and murdering newly-freed slaves. 68 The Report
of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction catalogued these abuses .69 States,
such as Mississippi, enacted laws after the Civil War that stated: "no
freedman, free negro or mulatto ... shall keep or carry fire-arms of any kind,

or any ammunition, dirk or bowie knife."70 This type of legislation by
southern states, leading up to and following the Civil War, necessitated
Congress to discuss newly-freed slaves' right to bear arms, and Congress
64

60 U.S. 393 (1857).

65 See Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044, 1059-60 (2018) (providing background to laws
enacted by Southern states), reh'g granted, 915 F.3d 681 (9th Cir. 2019).
66 See id. at 1059-60 (highlighting how African Americans were stripped of right to bear
arms); see also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 771 (2010) (quoting CERTAIN
OFFENSES OF FREEDMEN, 1865 Miss. LAWS p. 165, § 1, IN 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
RECONSTRUCTION 289 (W. Fleming ed. 1950)) (providing statute that prohibited minority groups
from "keeping" or "carrying" weapons, including knives and guns).
67 See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 770 (describing how some congressmen argued freedmen had
Second Amendment right to protect themselves); see also Clayton Cramer, The Racist Roots of
Gun Control, 4 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 17, 20 (1995) ("Unlike whites, however, free blacks and
slaves were required to have a license to carry weapons."); Nicholas Johnson, The Arming and
Disarming of Black America, SLATE (Feb. 10, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://slate.com/human-interest
/2018/02/what-reconstruction-and-its-end-meant-for-black-americans-who-had-fought-for-theright-to-keep-and-bear-arms.html [https://perma.cc/Z4XQ-4PPR] ("The Black Code restrictions
were a piece with violent attempts to disarm blacks perpetrated by local police, white state militias,
and Klan-type organizations that rose during Reconstruction to wage a war of Southern
'redemption.' The formal Ku Klux Klan emerged out of Tennessee in 1866. But across the South,
similar organizations cropped up under names like the White Brotherhood, the Knights of the White
Camellia, the Innocents, and the Knights of the Black Cross. Black disarmament was part of their
common agenda.").
68 See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 772 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1865))
(highlighting racism and hypocrisy of Confederacy).
69 See H.R. REP. NO.39-30, pt. 2, pp. 219,229,272, pt. 3, pp. 46,140, pt. 4, pp. 49-50 (18 6 6 )
(showing Congressional discussion on former confederates disarming freedmen); S. ExEC. DOC.
No. 39-2, at 23-24,26, 36 (1865) (same).
70 See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 771 (quoting CERTAIN OFFENSES OF FREEDMEN, 1865 Miss.
LAWS p. 165, § 1, in 1 DOcUMENTARY HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION 289 (W. Fleming ed. 1950))
(highlighting statute restricting African Americans' Second Amendment rights).
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ensured that African Americans were afforded the right to bear arms through
the enforcement of § 14 of the Freedmen's Bureau Act of 1866.?'
E. Failureto Establish Standardof Review
The Heller Court did not need to address a standard of review
because D.C.'s law failed "any of the standards of scrutiny that [the Court
has] applied to enumerated constitutional rights."72 Since Heller, circuit
courts have generally applied intermediate scrutiny . Although no standard
was adopted, the Court rejected rational basis scrutiny, as it "could not be
used to evaluate the extent to which a legislature may regulate a specific,
enumerated right."74 Justice Thomas argues that lower courts claim to apply
intermediate scrutiny when reviewing Second Amendment cases, but instead
conducted rational basis review, which to Justice Thomas is despicable
treatment of the Second Amendment." Lamenting that "[lesser] rights that
have no basis in the Constitution receive greater protection than the Second
Amendment, which is enumerated in the text[J" Justice Thomas has
consistently dissented in Second Amendment cases where the Court has
denied certiorari, and in December 2019-due in part to his dissents-the
Court finally heard a case pertaining to the Second Amendment.76
Since Heller, circuit courts have arrived at various conclusions as a
result of the Supreme Court's failure to declare the proper standard of review

7' See 14 Stat. 176-77 (1866) ("[Tlhe right .. to have full and equal benefit of all laws...
including the constitutional right to bear arms, shall be secured to and enjoyed by all the citizens...
without respect to race or color, or previous condition of slavery."). Furthermore, the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 sought to protect the right of all citizens to bear arms by stating that "full and equal
benefit of all laws ...for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens." 14
Stat. 27 (1866); see AKHL AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 264-265
(Yale Univ. Press, 60059th ed. 2000) (noting core purpose of Civil Rights Act of 1866 and
Fourteenth Amendment to "affirm the full and equal right of every citizen to self-defense").
72 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 580-600, 628 (2008) (highlighting why
such standard has not been addressed).
73 See Darrell A.H. Miller, Text, History, and Tradition: What the Seventh Amendment Can
Teach Us About the Second, 122 YALE L.J. 852, 867 (2013) (discussing application of intermediate
scrutiny by lower courts); Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV.
683, 686-87 (2007) (examining hundreds of state court opinions using interest balancing test).
74 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628, n.27 (explaining why rational basis standard is inappropriate
for enumerated right).
75 See Silvester v. Becarra, 138 S. Ct. 945, 947 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) (recognizing that "[i]ntermediate scrutiny also requires that a law not burden
substantially more protected activity than is necessary to further the government's interest."
(internal quotations omitted)).
76 See id. at 951 (highlighting Justice Thomas's anger at Court's indifference to Second
Amendment constitutional issues).
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77
Some circuits have applied intermediate
in Second Amendment cases.
scrutiny and upheld statutes that restricted individuals' right to carry in
public.7 Other circuits have not announced a standard, recognizing instead
that the right to carry is at the core of the Second Amendment, and even
restrictive statutes fail the rational basis review.7

III. YOUNG V. HAWAII
George Young, a citizen of the County of Hawaii, applied for a
license to carry a handgun on two occasions; the application was either for a
80
concealed or open carry permit. The County of Hawaii's Chief of Police
denied his application on both occasions because Young failed to satisfy the
81
requirements set forth in Hawaii's Revised Statute § 134-9. Section 134-9
provides that
In an exceptional case, when an applicant shows reason to
fear injury to the applicant's person or property, the chief of
police ... may grant a license to an applicant ... to carry a

pistol or revolver and ammunition therefor concealed on the
person... [w]here the urgency or need has been sufficiently

77 See cases cited supra note 12 (highlighting circuit split regarding individual right to carry).

See Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659, 677 (1st Cir. 2018),petitionfor cert.filed, (U.S. Apr.
1, 2019) (No. 18-1272) (applying intermediate scrutiny in determining legislature's authority to
refuse to grant unrestricted gun carrying licenses); Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426,440 (3d Cir. 2013)
("[W]e conclude that the 'justifiable need' standard withstands intermediate scrutiny."); Woollard
v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 882 (4th Cir. 2013) ("[U]nder the applicable intermediate scrutiny
standard, the State has demonstrated that the good-and-substantial-reason requirement is
reasonably adapted to Maryland's significant interests in protecting public safety and preventing
crime."); Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 96 (2d Cir. 2012) ("Because our
tradition so clearly indicates a substantial role for state regulation of the carrying of firearms in
public, we conclude that intermediate scrutiny is appropriate in this case.").
79 See Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044, 1071 (9th Cir. 2018) ("Notwithstanding the fact
that section 134-9 eviscerates a core Second Amendment right-and must therefore be
unconstitutional-the dissent would uphold the law under intermediate scrutiny. [This court does]
not wish to dive into the weeds of intermediate scrutiny, but [it does] feel obligated to note a few
aspects of the dissent's analysis that are patently inconsistent not only with intermediate scrutiny,
but with the judicial role itself."), reh'g granted, 915 F.3d 681 (9th Cir. 2019); Wrenn v. District
of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 667 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (analyzing levels of scrutiny to decide that law is
equivalent to total ban on carrying firearms and therefore, unconstitutional); Moore v. Madigan,
702 F.3d 933, 942 (7th Cir. 2012) ("Illinois had to provide [this court] with more than merely a
rational basis for believing that its uniquely sweeping ban is justified by an increase in public safety.
It has failed to meet this burden.").
80 See Young, 896 F.3d at 1048 (outlining origin of case before Ninth Circuit).
81 See id. (listing factors police chief may consider when issuing license to carry).
78
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indicated [and the applicant] ... is engaged in the protection

of life and property .82
The County of Hawaii implemented regulations clarifying what
proper open carry consisted of when the license holder is "in the actual
performance of his duties or within the area of his assignment."83 Without a
license under § 134-9, Young was forced to "transport an unloaded firearm,
in an enclosed container... and [could] only use those firearms while
8' 4
actually engaged in hunting or target shooting.
The district court dismissed Young's action on the merits, finding
that § 134-9 did not "implicate activity protected by the Second
Amendment" because the Amendment only protected the individual right to
"keep an operable handgun at home for self-defense. '8 The Ninth Circuit,
abiding by the Court's holding in Heller, stated that it must determine the
scope of the Second Amendment not as it appeared to them in present time,
but rather as within the scope understood by the Founders who promulgated
it.86 The Ninth Circuit applied a two-step approach in assessing Young's
Second Amendment challenge. 87 The court first determined "whether the
challenged law burdens conduct protected by the Second Amendment. '88 If
the law did burden Young's Second Amendment right, then the court
"applfied] an appropriate level of scrutiny."89
After conducting a
82 See HAW. REV. STAT. § 134-9 (2018) (articulating requirements for license to carry in

public).
83 See Police Dep't of Cty. of Hawaii, Rules and Regulations Governing the Issuance of
Licenses 10 (Oct. 22, 1997) (reflecting on strict requirements to attain gun permit).
84 See Young, 896 F.3d at 1048 (internal quotation marks omitted) (considering statutes effect
on Young).
85 See Young v. Hawaii, 911 F. Supp. 2d 972,989 (D. Haw. 2012), rev'd, 896 F.3d 1044 (9th
Cir. 2018), reh'g granted, 915 F.3d 681 (9th Cir. 2019) (highlighting subsequent history and why
trial court dismissed case on merits).
86 See Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044, 1051 (2018) (citing District of Columbia v. Heller,
554 U.S. 570, 634-35 (2008)) (emphasizing that courts should not construe scope of Second
Amendment based on present day concerns), reh'g granted, 915 F.3d 681 (9th Cir. 2019). The
Ninth circuit emphasized that text and history are "[o]ur lodestars." Id. at 1051.
87 See Jackson v. City of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 960 (9th Cir. 2014) (stating origin of
two-step Second Amendment approach from Ninth Circuit).
88 See id. (quoting United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1136 (9th Cir. 2013)) (stating first
issue court addressed).
89 See id. (demonstrating that first part of test must be satisfied for level of scrutiny to be
applied). Furthermore, Heller explained that rational basis review is inappropriate when evaluating
restrictions on individual's Second Amendment rights. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27. Thus, a more
heightened scrutiny is required, "such as intermediate or strict scrutiny." Young, 896 F.3d at 1051.
The Court in McDonald implored courts not to treat the Second Amendment differently from other
constitutional rights because it is not "a second-class right." McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561
U.S. 742,780 (2010).
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comprehensive textual and historical analysis, the Ninth Circuit concluded
that the "right to bear arms must guarantee some right to self-defense in
public."0

In determining the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply, the court
considered "(1) how close the law [came] to the core of the Second
Amendment right, and (2) the severity of the law's burden on the right."'"
There are two ends of the spectrum: on one end, a law so severe that it
destroys the Second Amendment right, which is unconstitutional under any
level of scrutiny; on the other end, where the challenged law "does not
implicate a core Second Amendment right, or does not place a substantial
burden on the Second Amendment right[,]" intermediate scrutiny may be
93
applied.9 2 The Ninth Circuit in Young acknowledged how other circuits
limited the core right to within the home, but ended up finding that Heller
94
implied a core purpose of self-defense not limited to the home. The Ninth
Circuit held in a two-to-one decision that "the Second Amendment does
protect a right to carry a firearm in public for self-defense," and because §
134-9's "limitation on the open carry of firearms to those 'engaged in the
protection of life and property' violates the core of the Second Amendment

and is void; the County may not constitutionally enforce such a limitation on
'9
The Ninth Circuit has since vacated
applicants for open carry licenses. '
en banc hearing until New York State
an
the Young decision and was pending
96
Rifle & PistolAss'n decision. Since New York State Rifle & PistolAss'n
was decided by the Supreme Court, the en banc hearing has been scheduled

for September 21, 2020.97

See Young, 896 F.3d at 1068 (concluding existence of some public carry right even though
Peruta struck down concealed carry right).
91 See Jackson, 746 F.3d at 963 (announcing two-part test).
92 See id. at 960-61 (discussing constitutionality of statutes).
90

93 See cases cited supra note 13 (describing how some circuits limited Heller's holding to
apply only within home).
94 See Young, 896 F.3d at 1069 (recognizing how Young majority disagreed with other
circuits). The Ninth Circuit noted Heller's reference to seven state constitutional provisions that
unequivocally protected a citizen's right to self-defense. Id. Thus, the Ninth Circuit followed
Heller and McDonald's "admonition that citizens be allowed to use firearms 'for the core lawful
purpose of self-defense."' Id. (citations omitted).
95 See Young, 896 F.3d at 1071, 1074 (emphasizing holding in Young).
96 See Hawaii v. Young, 915 F.3d 681,682 (9th Cir. 2019) ("The three-judge panel disposition
in this case shall not be cited as precedent by or to any court of the Ninth Circuit.").
97 See Status of Pending En Banc Cases, https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/enbanc/ (last visited
July 31, 2020) [https://perma.cc/Z9X7-ASF7] ("En banc argument will take place during the week
"....
).
of September 21,2020
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IV. ANALYSIS
In New York State Rifle & PistolAss'n, the Supreme Court let the
circuit split persist concerning whether open or concealed carry outside the
home is a core right of the Second Amendment.9 8 In the near future, the
Court will likely grant certiorari to a case similar to Young or Gould and
reach the constitutionality of a public carry statute. 9 The Heller Court
described the right to bear arms as "most acute" in the home; however, the
Court's language does not limit the right to only inside the home. 100 When
the Court hears a public carry case, it will have to grapple with the breadth
of the right; one can expect that the Court will recognize open carry as a core
98 See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. City of New York, No. 18-280, 2020 WL 1978708,
at *1 (U.S. Apr. 27, 2020) (ruling issue moot; thus, did not reach constitutionality issue); see also
Young, 896 F.3d at 1081-82 (Clifton, J., dissenting) (highlighting interrelation between core right
issue and scrutiny standards). In his dissent, Judge Clifton decided that intermediate scrutiny was
proper.
Because [he] conclude[d] that Hawaii's regulatory framework [did] not "impose[] such
a severe restriction on the fundamental right of self defense of the home that it amounts
to a destruction of the Second Amendment right," the most demanding level of review
that can be applied to Hawaii's regulatory framework is intermediate scrutiny.
Young, 896 F.3d at 1081 (Clifton, J., dissenting (citations omitted). The majority held that the law
is "unconstitutional under any level of scrutiny ... [because it] eviscerates a core Second
Amendment right." Id. at 1070-71 (majority opinion).
99 See Memo: Supreme Court CertiorariGrantin N.Y. State Rifle & PistolAss 'n v. City of New
York, supra note 19 ("What's more, court watchers have anticipated that the Supreme Court is fairly
likely to grant review in one or more cases addressing public concealed carry laws; the leading
contenders are cases called ... Gould v. Morgan."); see also Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659, 674
(1st Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Apr. 1, 2019) (No. 18-1272) ("The sockdolager, of
course, is that the defendants have forged a substantial link between the restrictions imposed on the
public carriage of firearms and the indisputable governmental interests in public safety and crime
prevention."). The First Circuit, in applying intermediate scrutiny, explained:
[Ilt is the legislature's prerogative-not ours-to weigh the evidence, choose among
conflicting inferences, and make the necessary policy judgments. In dealing with a
complex societal problem like gun violence, there will almost always be room for
reasonable minds to differ about the optimal solution. It follows, we think, that a court
must grant the legislature flexibility to select among reasonable alternatives. It would be
foolhardy-and wrong-to demand that the legislature support its policy choices with
an impregnable wall of unanimous empirical studies.
Gould, 907 F.3d at 676. Much like the First Circuit in Gould, the Ninth Circuit en banc hearing is
likely to arrive at the same conclusion as Gould and point to the problems associated with guns.
See id. ("The problems associated with gun violence are grave. Shootings cut short tens of
thousands of American lives each year. Massachusetts has made a reasoned attempt to reduce the
risks of gun violence on public streets .. ").
1OOSee District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008) (highlighting use of word
"acute" to demonstrate right extends outside home).
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right of the Second Amendment and refuse to recognize concealed carry as
such. 1 1 However, in recognizing open carry as a core right, the Court will
have to carefully craft a rule to prevent overbroad interpretations, as the
102
Heller Court has already acknowledged the right's constitutional limits.
Following Heller'shistorical analysis, one should expect the Court to put the
same emphasis on the state court cases from the Antebellum South period,
which typically ruled concealed carry laws unconstitutional and open carry
laws constitutional. 13 In analyzing the issue, the Court should take a closer
look at Colonial and Founding Era gun restrictions, specifically those in
guns prior to and
Boston, which provide an example of how a city regulated
10 4
during the time the Second Amendment was drafted.
A. Open Carryfor All? Not So Fast
It is undisputable that Heller and McDonald determined that selfdefense is the core of the Second Amendment. 10 5 If the Supreme Court
applies the same analysis as the Heller and McDonald Courts, especially
considering the Court's current makeup, the Court will likely declare that
self-defense is a core right of the Second Amendment that extends outside
the home; 10 6 however, due to states historically restricting concealed carry,
specifically in the Antebellum South-the time period Heller relied on for
its analysis -it is a monumental task to draft a rule to determine how broadly
7
to interpret an individual's right to carry outside the home. 0 The Heller
101 See Meltzer, supra note 33, at 1528 ("The Court's methodology in Heller and its reliance
on the nineteenth-century case law suggest that there must be some right to carry, and that open
carry, not concealed carry, is protected by the Second Amendment."); see also Volokh, supra note
60, at 1524 ("If Heller is correct to read the Second Amendment in light of post-enactment tradition
and not just Founding-era original meaning, this exclusion of concealed carry would be part of the
Second Amendment's scope as well.").
112 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27 ("[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws
forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings,
or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.").
103 See Meltzer, supra note 33, at 1530 ("Given Heller's reliance on modernityaccommodating carve-outs, however, perhaps we should prepare ourselves for just such an
unsatisfying and unprincipled resolution for the right to carry weapons outside the home.").
104 See discussion supra Section Il.A (highlighting arms' regulations during Founding era).
105 See cases cited supra note 8 (exhibiting how McDonald built upon Heller's emphasis on
self-defense being at heart of Second Amendment).
106 See Meltzer, supra note 33, at 1518 ("The argument for a Second Amendment that
guarantees the right to carry, but to carry only openly, is straightforward and grounded in fidelity
to Heller.").
107 See id. at 1519 ("[The Antebellum South courts'] understanding of the right to carry for
self-defense explicitly encompassed a view that [open and concealed carry was] different, and that
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Court particularly focused on the Antebellum South period, providing the
Court with what appears to be two simple holdings: (1) open carry is a core
right of Second Amendment; and (2) concealed carry is not; 08 however, if
the Court were to supplement the analysis conducted in Heller and
McDonald, not only will the Court understand that states have always been
leery of licensing individuals seeking concealed carry permits, but also, that
states, such as Massachusetts, have limited the carrying of weapons in
markets dating back to the Colonial and Founding era and have also adopted
good cause statutes since 1836.19
B. Heller's Oversight of History of State Regulation of Firearms
The Heller Court and some scholars do not directly address the fact
that states and cities, prior to the passage of the Second Amendment,
promoted public safety by instituting laws to prevent guns from being stored
and carried in particular areas within a city's limits. 10 Furthermore, Texas's
original Constitutional provision regarding the right to bear arms explicitly
stated that the right is dependent on the restrictions enacted by the
legislature."' The majority in Young gets engrossed in explaining how the
outcome of State v. Duke depended on the clause of Texas's Constitutional
right to bear arms, which allowed for government regulation; however, what
it should have focused on is that the Texas's Constitution drafters understood
the Second Amendment to only go so far as the "legislature may

only open carry was protected. Antebellum state courts explicitly valorized the type of self-defense
guaranteed by open carry and rejected what they saw as the deficiencies of concealed carry.").
108 See id. (emphasizing logical conclusion stemming from Heller's analysis).
109 See Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044, 1078 (9th Cir. 2018) (Clifton, J., dissenting) (citing
1836 Mass. Laws 748, 750, ch. 134, § 16) ("[Massachusetts'] law provided an exception to its
limitation on public carry for those with 'reasonable cause to fear an assault or other injury, or
violence to his person, or to his family or property."'), reh'g granted, 915 F.3d 681 (9th Cir. 2019);
see also sources cited supra note 45 (showing Colonial era regulation of arms). Judge Clifton
further explained that in Peruta, the Ninth Circuit recognized that regulation of public carry has
roots in English law, which date back to the thirteenth century as "England regulated public carry
of firearms, including both concealed and concealable weapons." Young, 896 F.3d at 1077.
"10 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 683-84 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasizing states' history of
regulating Second Amendment); see also sources cited supra note 97 (showing state regulation of
firearms in late 1600s to mid-1800s).
"'
See Young, 896 F.3d at 1058 (explaining why State v. Duke court concluded that legislature
could confine carry of firearms to certain places). In Young, the majority explained this outcome
by pointing to the language of Texas Constitutional provision, which allowed the legislature to
restrict right: "every person shall have the right to keep and bear arms in the lawful defense of
himself or the State, under such regulations as the Legislature may prescribe." Id. (emphasis
added).
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prescribe." 1 12 This indicates an understanding by the drafters of state laws
and constitutions that guns present a particular safety issue that requires, as
scholar Joseph Blocher puts it "local tailoring.""' 3 Furthermore, Southern
states restricted individuals' right to concealed carry because the states
viewed it as devious behavior." 4 This long history of states' restricting
individuals' Second Amendment right shows that the Court must
acknowledge and allow for this regulation to continue and also shows the
importance of drafting a rule that will preserve the right for states to restrict
individuals' public carrying rights." 5
The historical analysis conducted in Heller and discussed by
subsequent scholars indicates how each side can embrace different
interpretations of the meaning of state constitutional provisions or statutes at
various time periods in American and English history. 1 6 States have
restricted Second Amendment rights both rightfully' and wrongfully.' 18 In
the past, the right to bear arms for the purpose of self-defense acted as a
check in protecting African Americans and their communities to a certain
extent in the Jim Crow South; since community racism bled into police
departments, the knowledge that African Americans had the right to bear
The Second
arms sometimes tempered excessive police tactics." 9
Amendment and racial justice have been inextricably intertwined throughout
history, as some southern states prohibited African Americans from owning
112 Contra Young, 896 F.3d at 1058 (discussing State v. Duke to elaborate how majority went
awry).
113 See Blocher, supra note 53, at 145 ("Firearm localism suggests that whenever [concealed
carry] cases involve municipal restrictions, extra deference is due."). Firearm localism supposes
that guns have been regulated in cities for a long period of time, and due to this regulation, national
uniformity to individuals' Second Amendment Right should not be a goal, but instead local
tailoring should be allowed in instances where cities enact a law for safety purposes. Id. at 14046.
114 See sources cited supra note 60 (pointing out that held concealed carry is not constitutional
right).
115 See supra notes 12, 50, and accompanying text (showing courts evaluating various state
statutes which restrict rights of individuals).
116 Compare District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 605-19 (2008) (emphasizing how
majority analyzed historical texts), with id. at 662-71 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (demonstrating to
how differently Justice Stevens interpreted same history).
117 See sources cited supra notes 56 & 57 (showing states during Antebellum South period
restricting right to concealed carry).
"' See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (holding Heller had right to bear arms in his home for purposes
of self-defense); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010) (holding ordinances
effectively banning handguns violated Second Amendment).
119 See Johnson, supra note 67 ("But even as it became impractical for black Americans to
advance their rights through political violence, gun ownership could provide them an essential
means of private self-defense.").
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firearms prior to and after the Civil War, which prompted Congress to protect
freedmen's right to carry.120 To conclude: the core right of the Second
Amendment was and is self-defense, which extends in some way outside the
home, but cities and states should still have ultimate power to restrict that
right.

12 1

To ignore statistics in an age of data is unwise: Gabrielle Giffords, a
senator that survived an assassination attempt, founded a legal research
center, which grades states based on the strengths and weaknesses of their
gun laws.12 2 When comparing states' gun death rates with the given strength

of gun laws grade, there is a correlation outside of a few outliers: the stronger
a state's gun laws, the less gun violence.12 3 States-eager to strengthen their
gun laws-must emphasize such statistics in the future, especially if the
Court were to hold that the right to possess a firearm outside the home is a
core right. 124 The Supreme Court failed to address whether the Second
Amendment extends outside the home in New York State Rifle & PistolAss'n
due to its focus on other issues at the oral argument hearing; in a future case,
if the Court declared a strict scrutiny standard, it would alter the public carry
landscape by forcing states to construe statutes narrowly enough to achieve
their purpose, which would effectively prohibit states from enacting statutes
limiting citizens' gun rights, which is why the Court should establish
125
intermediate scrutiny as the proper standard.

120

See sources cited supra note 71 (highlighting Congressional action to protect newly freed

slaves' Second Amendment right to bear arms).
121 See cases cited supra note 13 (showing four circuits that allowed states to regulate firearms
because of compelling state interest).
122 See Annual Gun Law Scorecard,supra note 5 (showing direct correlation between weak
gun laws and higher gun violence).
123 See id. (highlighting section of webpage named: "Fewer People Die From Gun Violence In
States With Strong Gun Laws"). For instance, in the ten states that the Giffords Law Center rate
as having the strongest gun laws, seven are amongst states with the lowest gun death rate in the
country. Id. Also, of the ten states with the lowest score on their gun laws, five are in the top ten
highest gun death rates in the country. Id.
124 See Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044, 1082 (9th Cir. 2018) (Clifton, J. dissenting) (showing
how dissent highlights arguments made by Hawaii in wanting court to uphold statute), reh'g
granted, 915 F.3d 681 (9th Cir. 2019).
125 See cases cited supra note 12 (highlighting how circuits applied strict scrutiny in striking
down statutes that burdened Second Amendment right). Strict scrutiny is difficult to overcome
because a statute must pass the following three pronged test: (1) it must be justified by a compelling
state interest; (2) it must be narrowly tailored to achieve that goal; and (3) the law or policy must
be the least restrictive means. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010).
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C. Standard of Scrutiny and Why it Matters?

Overcoming strict scrutiny is particularly challenging, as no court
that has applied strict scrutiny to a statute restricting the Second Amendment
has upheld such a statute.'26 That is why declaring open carry as a core right
of the Second Amendment is problematic; it would not allow states or cities
127
The Court
to adopt statutes they see fit in protecting the public's safety.
must adopt a rule establishing intermediate scrutiny as the correct standard
2 8
and outline the proper approaches for circuits to apply the standard.1
Without well-defined guidance from the Supreme Court, it will be up to
federal district and circuit courts to dive deep into all the evidence that
district attorneys and attorney generals provide reasons for the intent of their
29
municipalities' or states' statute to restrict Second Amendment rights.'
V. CONCLUSION
Due to political beliefs and differences in interpretation of historical
texts, some legal scholars will always argue that the right to bear arms is a
collective right and not an individual one, and Heller's outcome was
erroneous. Furthering such an argument after Heller and McDonald ignores
the legal landscape of Second Amendment jurisprudence. Thus, perceiving
the right to bear arms as an individual right with self-defense at its core, the
debate becomes much more poignant, turning on whether that right extends
outside the home. One thing is clear from researching the cases and
historical references cited in Heller and McDonald-that the history
predating and post-enactment of the Second Amendment is muddled. Selfdefense is at the core of the Second Amendment, and one can argue that it
extends outside the home; however, although this right exists in some form,
it is ignorant to ignore the plethora of state constitutional amendments and
statutes from the Colonial Era to the late nineteenth century, which show
how states never hesitated to restrict individuals' Second Amendment rights
to carry outside the home. Texas's original Constitutional provision creating
126 See cases cited supra note 12 (showing how application of strict scrutiny in Second
Amendment cases leads to striking down of legislation).
127 See SARAH HERMAN PECK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44618, POST-HELLER SECOND
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE 15-16 (2019) (emphasizing how rigorous and difficult it is to
overcome strict scrutiny standard).
128 See id. (pointing to guidance necessary for circuits to uniformly apply intermediate
scrutiny); see also Silvester v. Becarra, 138 S. Ct. 945, 951 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) (pleading that Court should clarify standard which is to be applied).
129 See generally Annual Gun Law Scorecard, supra note 5 (showing statistical data that has
and will be presented to courts to prove governmental interest).
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a right to bear arms stated: "under such regulations as the Legislature may
prescribe." Cities, specifically the colonial and founding era city of Boston,
adopted statutes, which promoted public safety and severely limited the
carrying of firearms in public places. The Court should continue to allow
cities and states to restrict individuals' public carry rights as they see fit, so
long as the state or city.
Today, the smallest towns can have public markets as large as the
market located in the city of Boston during the Founding Era. Any strip
mall, outdoor mall, or local Walmart, such as the one in my Massachusetts'
hometown, is larger than the markets of Boston during that time. If the city
of Boston during that era was concerned about the carrying of firearms in
special areas, like a market, then when considering the population explosion
since then in urban, suburban, and even rural America, it would be improper
to prevent state and local governments from instituting laws they believe are
in the best interest of the public's safety. Thus, when the Supreme Court
addresses an issue regarding the public carry of firearms, it should institute
a clear intermediate scrutiny, not a strict scrutiny, standard for lower courts
to apply to state statutes that restrict the carrying of firearms outside the
home. Moreover, the Court should recognize that state and municipal
enactments are owed greater deference due to the Second Amendment being
a prime candidate for "local tailoring." The makeup of the Court suggests
that gun rights will be expanded; however, in this day and age, it is difficult
to ignore the danger guns pose to Americans in public places. Due to this
danger, the Court should draft a rule that allows states and municipalities to
continue to restrict gun carrying rights in public as they see fit within the
parameters set by Heller and McDonald.
Nick McLaughlin

